|Position:||Assistant Professor, School of Information|
Director, Data-Intensive Development Lab
University of California, Berkeley
p: (510) 642-1464 / f: (510) 642-5814
for encrypted correspondence: my public key
|My work focuses on using novel data and methods to better understand the economic lives of the poor. Most projects are based in developing and conflict-affected countries.|
News and updates
- 12/2016: Upcoming talks at Stanford, U.C. Berkeley, Pac-Dev, Economic Demography Workshop
- 08/2016: New papers in Science, KDD, ICML DSSG
- 07/2016: News: I will be joining the faculty at U.C. Berkeley in Fall 2016. A fond farewell to my wonderful friends and colleagues at UW!
- show more...
Blumenstock, JE (2016). Fighting Poverty with Data, Science, 353(6301), 753-754
Policy-makers in the world's poorest countries are often forced to make decisions based on limited data. Consider Angola, which recently conducted its first postcolonial census. In the 44 years that elapsed between the prior census and the recent one, the country's population grew from 5.6 million to 24.3 million, and the country experienced a protracted civil war that displaced millions of citizens. In situations where reliable survey data are missing or out of date, a novel line of research combines big data and machine learning to offer promising alternatives.
Blumenstock, JE, Cadamuro, G, On, R (2015). Predicting Poverty and Wealth from Mobile Phone Metadata, Science, 350(6264), 1073-1076
Accurate and timely estimates of population characteristics are a critical input to social and economic research and policy. We show that an individual's past history of phone use can be used to infer his or her socioeconomic status, and that the predicted attributes of millions of individuals can in turn be used to accurately reconstruct the distribution of wealth of an entire nation, or to infer the asset distribution of micro-regions comprised of just a few households. In resource-constrained environments where censuses and household surveys are rare, this creates an option for gathering localized and timely information at a fraction of the cost of traditional methods.
Blumenstock, JE, Eagle, N, Fafchamps, M (2016). Airtime Transfers and Mobile Communications: Evidence in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, Journal of Development Economics, 120: 157-181
We provide empirical evidence that an early form of "mobile money" is used to share risk. Our analysis is based on the entire universe of mobile phone-based communications over a four-year period in Rwanda, including millions of interpersonal transfers sent over the mobile phone network. Exploiting the quasi-random timing and location of natural disasters, we show that people make transfers to individuals affected by economic shocks. Unlike other documented forms of risk sharing, the mobile-phone based transfers are sent over large geographic distances and in response to covariate shocks. Transfers are more likely to be sent to wealthy individuals, and are sent predominantly between pairs of individuals with a strong history of reciprocal exchange. [View Video]
Mobile-izing Savings with Automatic Contributions: Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency and the Default Effect in Afghanistan - joint with Michael Callen (Harvard) and Tarek Ghani (UC Berkeley)
Through a field experiment in Afghanistan, we show that default enrollment in payroll deductions increases rates of savings by 40 percentage points, and that this increase is driven by present-biased preferences. Working with Afghanistan's primary mobile phone operator, we designed and deployed a new mobile phone-based automatic payroll deduction system. Each of 967 employees at the country's largest rm was randomly assigned a default contribution rate (either 0% or 5%) as well as a matching incentive rate (0%, 25%, or 50%). We find that employees initially assigned a default contribution rate of 5% are 40 percentage points more likely to contribute to the account 6 months later than individuals assigned to a default contribution rate of zero; to achieve this effect through financial incentives alone would require a 50% match from the employer. We also find evidence of habit formation: default enrollment increases the likelihood that employees continue to save after the trial ended, and increases employees' self-reported interest in saving and sense of financial security.
Social Networks and Internal Migration - joint with Xu Tan (University of Washington)
How does the structure of an individual's social network affect his decision to migrate? We study the migration decisions of roughly one million individuals in Rwanda over a period of several years, using novel data from the monopoly mobile phone operator to reconstruct the complete social network of each individual in the months prior to migration. We use these data to directly validate several classic theories of migration that have historically been difficult to test, for instance that individuals with closely-knit networks in destination communities are more likely to migrate. Our analysis also uncovers several empirical results that have not been documented in the prior literature, and which are not consistent with common theories of how individuals derive value from their social networks. We propose a simple model of strategic cooperation to reconcile these results.
Why do referrals work? Selection and peer influence in a million-person network experiment - joint with Greg Fischer (LSE), Dean Karlan (Yale), and Adnan Khan (LSE)
In contexts ranging from health and agriculture to product marketing and job search, individuals referred through social networks are often more likely to take an action than individuals acting in isolation. We conduct an experiment on Pakistan's largest mobile phone network to understand why referrals are effective. The experiment allows us to separate the effect of "selection," whereby individuals referred through social networks have characteristics that make them more likely to act (Beaman & Magruder), from "influence," or the effect of the referral itself, including endorsement (BenYishay & Mobarak), enforcement (Bryan, Karlan, Zinman), and learning (Conley & Udry).
Violence and Financial Decisions: Experimental Evidence from Mobile Money in Afghanistan - joint with Michael Callen (UCLA) and Tarek Ghani (UC Berkeley)
We provide evidence that violence affects how people make financial decisions. Exploiting the quasi-random timing of several thousand violent incidents in Afghanistan, we show that individuals who are exposed to violence are less likely to adopt and use mobile money, a new financial technology, and are more likely to retain cash on hand. This effect is corroborated using data from three independent sources: (i) the entire universe of 5 years of mobile money transactions in Afghanistan; (ii) high-frequency data from a randomized experiment designed to increase mobile money adoption; and (iii) a behavioral lab-in-the-field experiment with experienced mobile money users. Collectively, the evidence highlights an economic cost of violence that operates through individual beliefs, which is large enough to impede the development of formal financial systems in conflict settings.
A Society of Silent Separation: The Impact of Migration on Ethnic Segregation in Estonia - joint with Ott Toomet (Tartu University)
We exploit a novel source of data to model the impact of migration and urbanization on segregation in Estonia. Analyzing the complete mobile phone records of hundreds of thousands of Estonians, we find that the ethnic composition of an individual's geographic neighborhood heavily influences the structure of the individual's phone-based network. We further find that patterns of segregation are significantly different for migrants than for the at-large population: migrants are more likely to interact with coethnics than non-migrants, but are less sensitive to the ethnic composition of their immediate neighborhood than non-migrants.